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We assess the impact of cognitive abilities on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run game. In 
our setup, depositors choose sequentially between withdrawing or keeping their funds 
deposited in a common bank. They may observe previous decisions depending on the 
information structure. Theoretically, the last depositor in the sequence of decisions has a 
dominant strategy and should always keep the funds deposited, regardless of what she 
observes (if anything). Recognizing the dominant strategy, however, is not always 
straightforward. If there exists strategic uncertainty (e.g., the last depositor has no 
information about predecessors’ decisions) the identification of the dominant strategy 
requires harder thinking than when there is not strategic uncertainty (e.g., the last depositor 
is informed about all previous decisions). We find that cognitive abilities, as measured by 
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), predict withdrawals in the presence of strategic 
uncertainty (participants with higher abilities tend to identify the dominant strategy more 
easily) but the CRT does not predict behavior when there is no strategic uncertainty. 
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Összefoglaló 
 
A kognitív képességek hatását vizsgáljuk betétkivételi döntésekre egy bankrohamjátékban.  
A játékban a betétesek egymás után döntenek arról, hogy kivegyék-e pénzüket a bankból 
vagy bennhagyják. Az információs struktúra határozza meg, hogy a betétesek 
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tween withdrawing or keeping their funds deposited in a common bank.
They may observe previous decisions depending on the information
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quires harder thinking than when there is not strategic uncertainty
(e.g., the last depositor is informed about all previous decisions). We
find that cognitive abilities, as measured by the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT), predict withdrawals in the presence of strategic uncer-
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1 Introduction
«If the people would only leave their money in the banks instead of
withdrawing it...everything would work out all right.»
J. P. Morgan in "Bankers Calm; Sky Clearing."
New York Times, October 26, 1907.
Standard economic theory assumes that agents are rational and make
optimal decisions. Laboratory experiments, however, highlight that partici-
pants do frequently undertake suboptimal decisions. Eventually, this is just
an illustration of real life phenomena that might have noteworthy economic
consequences. The events in US housing markets that fostered the recent
economic downturn, for example, were likely due in part to poor financial
decision making (see Gerardi et al., 2013). These bad decisions do also take
place in other financial environments. Choi et al. (2011) find that some
employees forego arbitrage profits by making suboptimal investment choices
to retirement plans (see also van Rooij et al., 2011). Bertrand and Morse
(2011) note that some individuals may not be aware of the real costs of the
loan from payday lenders, what may induce them to take up extremely ex-
pensive loans from them (despite the fact that information about alternative
ways of getting money is easily available).
Since bad financial decisions may lead to severe economic losses, it is
instructive to understand what factors may cause them. A straightforward
answer to consider is that individuals are not as rational as the standard
economic theory suppose. They may have not the cognitive abilities to
overcome the potentially complex financial problems or they may act im-
pulsively without appropriate deliberation. There is a growing literature
studying how cognitive abilities affect financial decision making (see Korni-
otis and Kumar 2010 for a survey). In this paper, we contribute to this
literature using a lab experiment in which we study participants’ decisions
in a bank-run game (see Kiss et al. 2014a, 2014b). As suggested by the
opening sentence of J. P. Morgan, bank runs involve deciding in a setup
where choosing an action (in this case, withdrawing money from the bank)
may be in conflict with the rationality assumption, so it is worth analyzing
the extent to which participants behave rationally.
In our game, depositors have to choose whether to withdraw their funds
from a bank or keep it deposited. They decide in various informational
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setups that differ in the participant’s position in the sequence of decision and
the information that is available (both about previous depositors’ decision
and if subsequent depositors will observe the decision of the participant).
Payoffs are such that keeping the money deposited is the dominant strategy
for a depositor choosing in the last position, regardless of what is observed
(if anything). However, strategic uncertainty (that is, uncertainty regarding
the purposeful decision of others) makes the decision more difficult in our
setup for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the computation of payoffs
is easier when the depositor knows with certainty what the other participant
in the lab did.1 For instance, when a depositor in the last position observes
all the previous decisions or the fact that a previous depositor have already
kept the money in the bank, then she decides in a singleton information
set. By comparing payoffs corresponding to the choices yields simply that
keeping the money deposited is optimal. However, when a depositor in
the last position observes a withdrawal or none of the previous choices, the
computation of payoff is not immediate. Keeping the money deposited is
still a dominant strategy but it requires harder thinking, in contrast with the
straightforward comparison of payoffs in the previous case (this is because
the depositor needs to think about all the possible histories of decisions and
conclude that keeping the money deposited is the dominant strategy). On
the other hand, and relatedly to the previous point, strategic uncertainty
implies also payoff uncertainty. Because the payoff for a depositor in the
last position depends on what other depositors have done, a depositor who
observes nothing is uncertain about the payoff that his or her action will
yield, what may cause some stress resulting in suboptimal decision-making.2
We use the data from a previous experiment (Kiss et al. 2014b) to
investigate the depositors’ behavior when the available information changes
from round to round. We focus on the behavior of the last depositor in the
sequence because suboptimal behavior is clearly defined in that setup. To
measure cognitive abilities we use the Cognitive Reflection Test (hereafter,
CRT) devised by Frederick (2005). All the three questions in the test have
an answer that immediately springs to mind, but which is wrong. The test is
1There is a depositor who always withdraws simulated by the computer, as we will
explain later in more detail.
2Risk preferences are indeed correlated with different measures of cognitive abilities,
as it is shown in Andersson et al. (2013), Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2013),
Dohmen et al. (2010) and Oechssler et al. (2009).
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then intended to measure the tendency "to resist reporting the response that
first comes to mind", so that it may have some predictive power in depositors’
behavior as it is not just about intelligence, but also impulsiveness.3 Given
this experimental environment, we want to test if participants really play
the dominant strategy. Moreover, we attempt to understand what may
be behind the mistake of playing the dominated strategy. We conjecture
that strategic uncertainty and cognitive abilities are two main driving forces
behind suboptimal decisions. More precisely, we expect that i) participants
with higher cognitive abilities (as measured by the CRT) make less mistakes,
and ii) strategic uncertainty increases the likelihood of suboptimal choices.
We also attempt to investigate the relationship between cognitive abilities
and strategic uncertainty.
Our data show that participants tend to recognize the dominant strategy
and withdraw only in 10 percent of the cases. Interestingly, we find that
they incur in more mistakes when there is strategic uncertainty. In this case,
however, participants with higher cognitive abilities withdraw significantly
less. This is not the case when there is no strategic uncertainty, because
then CRT does not have any predictive power.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review briefly the
literature. Section 3 presents the bank-run game that we use in the experi-
ment. Section 4 contains the experimental design, and results are in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. On the one hand,
it is connected to the papers that investigate how cognitive abilities affect
optimal decisions and economic behavior in general, and on the other hand
it belongs to the literature that studies financial mistakes and analyzes its
causes.
Related to the first branch of the literature, a noteworthy aspect of our
study is that there is a dominant strategy that participants should play if
rational. It has been long observed, however, that experimental participants
3As noted by Bosch-Domènech et al. (2014) "What makes the CRT different from
problem-solving or math tests is that the latter tests do not usually trigger a plausible
intuitive response that must be overridden." (page 2)
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do not always choose as the theory predicts. Recently, several papers at-
tempt to explain this discordance with cognitive abilities. These studies
connect individuals’ cognitive abilities, as measured by standard tests, with
performance in different games. Casari et al. (2007) study auctions and
find that individuals with higher scores in the Scholastic Achievement Test
(SAT) or the American College Test (ACT)4 avoid the winner’s curse more
than the unskilled ones. It has also been observed that cognitive abilities
affect the degree of strategic sophistication in the Hit-15 (Carpenter et al.,
2013) in games that require the application of iterated dominance such as
the beauty context (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Carpenter et al., 2013; Gill
and Prowse, 2014; Rydval et al., 2009), as well as in some two-person 3x3
normal form games (Grimm and Mengel, 2012).5
We depart from these studies in that they focus on the ability of the
participants for finding the equilibrium or not playing dominated strate-
gies, whereas we investigate the effect of cognitive abilities on the choice of
the dominant strategy. Although it has been observed that in some environ-
ments participants do not play the dominant strategy (Grosskopf and Nagel,
2008), the effects of CRT scores on choices has not been analyzed yet.
Related to the second strand of the literature, there is a recent but
rapidly growing literature on cognitive abilities and financial decisions (see
Korniotis and Kumar (2010) for a survey on this topic). These papers show
that cognitive abilities correlate with bubbles (Corgnet et al., 2014), saving
decisions (Ballinger et al., 2011) and behavioral biases, such as anchoring
(Bergman et al, 2010) or the conjunction fallacy (Oechssler et al, 2009). A
higher participation in the stock market (which is frequently used as proxy
for the quality of financial decisions) has been found positively related with
IQ scores (Kezdi and Willis, 2003; Christelis et al., 2010; Benjamin et al.,
2013). Other papers go further and use more specific measures of decision-
making. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (2012) and Korniotis and Kumar
4Both SAT and ACT attempt to capture academic achievement. Originally, SAT was
an abbreviation of Scholastic Aptitude Test, but presently SAT does not denote a sequence
of words.
5Grimm and Mengel (2012) investigate learning and whether play converges to Nash
equilibrium. They find that the complexity of the environment affects convergence, failure
to converge is attributed to higher cognitive costs. For further studies on the relationship
between cognitive abilities and strategic behavior see, among others, Allred et al. (2014),
Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011, 2012), Burks et al. (2009), Jones
(2008), Jones (2011).
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(2013) use different data sets and find that the portfolios of investors with
high cognitive abilities perform significantly better in various aspects (e.g.
stock-picking, trade execution) than those of investors with low abilities.
In some sudies, suboptimal decision-making is even clearer defined. For
instance, Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) identify two instances (one re-
lated to credit card use and the other to home equity loan application) in
which suboptimal decisions lead to clear financial losses. They find that
consumers with higher overall test scores, and specifically those with higher
math scores, are substantially less likely to make a financial mistake.6 Ger-
ardi et al. (2013) find that cognitive (more precisely numerical) ability
affects mortgage defaults. Individuals with lower numerical ability are more
likely to default on their mortgages.
Our setup resembles depositor behavior, an important kind of financial
decision-making not covered by the previous studies. We use the CRT to
predict the depositor’s behavior, as the right answer to these questions can
only be found by engaging in some cognitive reflection. Since during finan-
cial hardship people often panick and are driven by impulsive acts, this test
seems appropriate to capture several aspects that may be behind subopti-
mal decisions. In light of the bank runs that occurred since the financial
crisis erupted, it seems of first-order importance to understand how cognitive
abilities may affect bank runs.
3 The sequential bank-run game
The seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) models bank runs as
a coordination problem among depositors. In their framework, decisions
are made simultaneously and depositors may decide to run the bank as an
equilibrium outcome. Recently, sequential decisions have received some at-
tention in bank run literature (e.g., Gu, 2011). The experimental evidence
highlights that observing what other depositors have done may affect de-
positors’ behavior (e.g., Garratt and Keister, 2009) even if decisions in the
simultaneous and in the sequential setup should not differ (Schotter and
Yorulmazer, 2009). These results are in line with empirical studies that
reveal the importance of observing previous decisions (e.g., Kelly and O
6In this study, cognitive skills were measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT) score which contains information on both math and verbal ability.
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Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2012), and it calls for
an extension of the simultaneous-move setup in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
In section 3.1 we build upon these lines and present a simple coordination
game among three depositors, which we implement in the lab by allowing
for observability of actions (see Kiss et al. 2012, 2014a). As we shall see
in section 3.2, our game has a clear-cut prediction: the last depositor in
the sequence of decision (hereafter, depositor 3) has a dominant strategy.
This dominant strategy may or may not be easy to identify, depending on
what depositor 3 observes. We conjecture in section 3.2 that cognitive abili-
ties and strategic uncertainty may have some predictive power in explaining
departures from the equilibrium prediction.
3.1 The setup
Consider a bank that is formed by 3 depositors. At t = 0, each of them de-
posits her initial endowment (in our experiment, 80 ECUs) in this bank that
has thus initially 240 ECUs to be invested in a project. The project yields
a sure high return in period t = 2, and the investment can be liquidated
without any cost at t = 1, yielding no net return.
At t = 1 depositors choose in an exogenously determined sequence
whether they want to withdraw their initial endowment or keep it deposited
(that we also call waiting). Depositor i is the one that chooses in position
i, where i = 1, 2, 3. If a depositor decides to withdraw, she immediately
receives 100 ECUs as long as there is enough money in the bank to pay this
amount (out of this amount, 80 ECUs correspond to the initial endowment
and 20 ECUs are obtained in the form of interests). In our experiment, if
depositors 1 or 2 withdraw, each of them receives 100 ECUs for sure. But if
depositor 3 decides to withdraw after two withdrawals, she only receives 40
ECUs (because the first two depositors who withdrew received 100 ECUs
each and the bank has only 40 ECUs to pay her). However, if depositor 3
withdraws after only one or no withdrawal, the bank pays her 100 ECUs. In
sum, if one or two depositors decide to withdraw at t = 1, then they receive
100 ECUs. If all three depositors choose to withdraw, then the first two in
the line get 100 ECUs each, while the last one receives the remaining 40
ECUs.
Depositors who decide to wait receive their payoff in period t = 2. The
amount that depositors receive in t = 2 depends on the total number of
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waitings, which indeed determine the money that the bank has at t = 2.
If only one depositor waits, she receives 60 ECUs.7 If two depositors wait,
then each of them gets 140 ECUs. In our model, we assume that the three
depositors cannot wait and keep the money deposited in the bank. In par-
ticular, one of the depositors is hit by a liquidity shock at t = 1 and is
forced to withdraw.8 In line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there exists
no aggregate uncertainty about the fundamental liquidity demand; i.e., it is
common information in our setup that one of the depositors will need the
money and will be forced to withdraw. Following the literature, we refer to
this depositor as impatient depositor, whereas depositors who can wait or
withdraw their money are called patient depositors.
The decision situation in our study is such that it pays off for patient
depositors to wait if they know or believe that the other patient depositor
does so as well. Our setup, however, differs from standard coordination
games in that it allows for observability of actions, which is an important
aspect in bank run episodes (e.g., Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and
Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2011). More specifically, depositors may or
may not observe what other depositors have done depending on the position
in the line and the information structure in which depositors are set in.
Information about what is observed and the position in the line is revealed
to depositors before they are asked to decide in period t = 1. We present
the sequence of events of our model in Figure 1.
Depositors receive 80 ECUs  
and deposit it in the bank 
Depositors learn their types, 
the information structure and  
their position in the line 
Depositors decide in sequence 
whether to withdraw and receive 
{100,40} ECUs or to wait 
The bank carries  
out the project 
Depositors who waited  
receive {140,60} ECUs. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
            Figure 1: Timeline for the sequence of events.
As commented above, the available information about previous decisions
depends on the information structure. An information structure is deter-
mined by a set of links among depositors. A link is represented by a pair
7After two withdrawals 40 ECUs remain in the bank at the end of t = 1 and this
amount earns 20 ECUs of interest until t = 2).
8This is implemented in our experiment by having a depositor simulated by the com-
puter, which is programmed to always withdraw.
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of numbers ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i < j. The existence of the link ij implies
that depositor j observes depositor i and depositor i knows that depositor j
will observe her. For instance, 12 denotes that depositor 1 and depositor 2
are linked; therefore, depositor 1 knows that depositor 2 will observe her ac-
tion and that depositor 2 chooses after observing depositor 1’s action. Links
are independent of types (patient vs. impatient), so depositors of the same
type are not more likely to be linked, nor is there any relationship between
types and the number of links. Position and the number of links are also
independent (e.g., depositors in position 1 do not have systematically more
links that subsequent depositors).
We attempt to study the depositor’s behavior in all possible information
structures, not only in simultaneous and completely sequential decisions
(e.g., Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al. 2012). In our setup with
three depositors, there are 8 possible networks: (12, 23, 13), (12, 23), (12, 13),
(13, 23), (12), (13), (23), (∅), where (∅) stands for the empty network, which
has no links at all, whereas the structure (12, 23, 13) contains all the possible
links and is called the complete network.9 We assume that the information
structure is not commonly known, information is local and thus no depositor
knows whether the other two depositors are connected. The motivation
for studying all these information setups is that as shown by the empirical
literature cited above observing other depositors’ decision seems to be crucial
in the understanding of depositor behavior. However it is not clear which
information structure describes best the observability of decisions, so we
decided to study all possibilities in small-scale environment.
In our experiment (detailed in section 4) we vary the information struc-
ture across rounds. Suppose then that the information structure (12, 23)
is randomly selected in one of the rounds, with patient depositors being
randomly set in position 1 and 3. Because information is local, depositor
1 knows that depositor 2 (depositor 3) will (not) observe her decision. De-
positor 1, however, does not know whether depositor 3 will observe what
depositor 2 has done. In that regard, from depositor 1’s point of view, she
may be either in the network (12,23) or in (12,13,23). In our design, both
9The empty network can be interpreted as a simultaneous-move game where depositors
have no information about other depositors’ actions, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
The only difference is that positions are known in our setup but not in theirs. On the other
hand, the complete network represents a fully sequential setup, meaning that depositors
observe all predecessors’ actions.
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possibilities are equally likely. Along these lines, if the structure (12,23) is
randomly selected, depositor 3 chooses after observing only what depositor
2 has done, but she has no information about whether depositor 2 observes
depositor 1 or not. Important for the present study, in some rounds of the
experiment depositor 3 chose after knowing what depositor 1 and 2 have
done, whereas in some other rounds she had no information at all or was
only informed about the decision of one of the previous depositors.10
As already noted earlier, one of the depositors always withdraws, in-
creasing substantially the degree of strategic uncertainty. More precisely, in
a setup in which depositor 3 observes a withdrawal, she does not know if
this is due to the impatient depositor or to a patient depositor that decided
to withdraw. Similarly, in a context in which nothing is observed, depositor
3 decides in presence of strategic uncertainty, not knowing what the other
patient depositor has done.
3.2 Predictions
Next, we posit a clear-cut prediction of our model that we want to test with
our behavioral data.11
Proposition. Depositor 3 has a dominant strategy and should always wait
if patient, regardless of what she observes (if anything).
Proof. Since one of the depositors is forced to withdraw, the depositor 3’s decision
can be preceded by two withdrawals, or one waiting and one withdrawal. It is
straightforward to show that waiting is a dominant strategy for any of these two
possible history of decisions given the payoffs. We show next that the decisions that
are being observed by depositor 3 may determine how difficult it is to identify this
dominant strategy. If depositor 3 observes a waiting, or a waiting and a withdrawal,
by waiting she receives 140 ECUs whereas withdrawal would yield 100 ECUs in
these cases. Thus, it is clear that she should wait. Similarly, upon observing
two withdrawals, depositor 3 knows that the other patient depositor decided to
withdraw, so the best she can do is to wait and earn 60 ECUs (instead of earning
40 that a withdrawal would yield). However, if a depositor 3 observes a withdrawal,
10The same is true for depositor 1 and 2 (e.g., sometimes depositor 1 knows that depos-
itor 2 will observe her choice, whereas in other setups depositor 1 knows that nobody will
observe her). To see how the different information structures affect depositors’ decisions,
see Kiss et al. (2014a).
11This is part of the theoretical model in Kiss et al. (2014a)
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then she cannot infer whether it was due to the other patient depositor or the
impatient one. In either case, it is better for depositor 3 to wait. Note that waiting
(withdrawing) after two withdrawals yields 60 ECUs (40 ECUs), whereas waiting
(withdrawing) after a waiting and a withdrawal yields 140 ECUs (100 ECUs).
Depositor 3 should apply the same reasoning if she observes nothing (i.e., depositor
3 should think that for any possible history of decisions it is better for her to wait).
Our objective is to study the extent to which depositor 3 follows her
dominant strategy and waits. By the same token, we want to investigate
how the observability of actions affects her decision. More precisely, the
proof of our proposition - although simple - highlights that strategic un-
certainty may play a role. We say that there is no strategic uncertainty
if depositor 3 observes i) a waiting, ii) a waiting and a withdrawal, or iii)
two withdrawals, as observability of actions in these cases allows depositor
3 to fully identify the action of the other patient depositor. In that context,
choosing the dominant strategy should be easy for depositor 3, as it follows
from simply comparing the payoffs of waiting (140 ECUs) and withdrawing
(100 ECUs). Although waiting is also a dominant strategy in the context of
strategic uncertainty (i.e., when depositor 3 observes i) nothing or ii) only
a withdrawal) the computation of payoffs is not so straightforward, as the
depositor needs to figure out that waiting is the best option for any possible
history of decisions that is compatible with what is observed. In addition,
the depositor does not know whether waiting (withdrawing) will yield 60 or
140 ECUs (40 or 100 ECUs).
Next we summarize our research questions:
1. Does depositor 3 follow her dominant strategy and wait, regardless of
what is being observed?
2. Is depositor 3 more likely to wait when there is no strategic uncertainty
(i.e., when the other patient depositor’s action is observed) compared
with the case in which there is strategic uncertainty (because nothing
or only a withdrawal is observed)?
3. What is the predictive power of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
in identifying the dominant strategy? Do cognitive abilities predict
behavior in a context with (without) strategic uncertainty?
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4 Experimental Design
Two sessions were run at the LINEEX (University of Valencia) during June
2013 using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 60 partici-
pants having no previous experience in experiments dealing with coordina-
tion problems or financial decisions were recruited from the undergraduate
population of the University. All participants in the experiment were Eco-
nomics or Business students.
The experiment consisted of a total of 15 rounds following 3 trial rounds
to become familiar with the software. At the beginning of each round, each
participant was informed that she had been matched randomly to another
participant in the lab and a third depositor (simulated by the computer)
was also assigned to them so as to form a three-depositor bank. Partici-
pants played the game explained in section 3.1. They were told that they
had deposited 80 ECUs in the common bank and had to decide in each
round between waiting or withdrawing. Before making their decisions, par-
ticipants were privately informed about their position in the sequence of
decision (i=1,2,3), which was randomly and exogenously determined. De-
positors were also informed about other depositors’ decisions, depending
on the information structure. In the experiment, we considered all the 8
possible information structures as detailed in section 3.1.12
It was common knowledge in our experiment that three depositors formed
the bank and the computer was programmed to withdraw always (acting as
the impatient depositor). In each round participants were asked to choose
between waiting or withdrawing. We note that the position in the line and
the information structure changed across rounds (i.e., in each round, par-
ticipants were placed in a different position or faced a different environment
in that their links were different). Participants were made aware of these
features.
In both sessions, participants were divided into three matching groups of
10. Participants from different matching groups never interacted with each
other throughout the session. At the end of the experiment, participants
filled out a questionnaire that was used to collect additional information
about gender, the degree of risk aversion and cognitive abilities. We elicited
risk attitudes using the investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997).
12Appendix A contains the instructions.
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Each participant hypothetically received 10 Euros and was asked to choose
how much of it, x, (s)he wanted to invest in a risky option and how much
(s)he wished to keep. The amount invested yielded a dividend equal to
2.5x with 1/2 probability, being lost otherwise. The money not invested
in the risky option (10 − x) was kept by the participant. In this situation,
the expected value of investing is positive and increasing in the amount
invested; therefore a risk-neutral (or risk-loving) participant should invest
the 10 Euros, whereas a risk-averse participant will invest less. The amount
not invested in the risky asset is a natural measure of risk aversion. The
questionnaire contained also the CRT in Frederick (2005).
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes and participants received
on average 15 Euros, including the show-up fee of 3 Euros. For the payment,
we used a random lottery incentive procedure by which one choice (i.e., one
of the rounds) was randomly paid at the end of the experiment, with ECUs
being transformed in Euros using the exchange rate 10 ECUs = 1 Euro.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the sample. The socio-
demographics are presented in panel i). This includes information about
risk aversion (Gneezy and Potters, 1997), the participant’s gender, and the
score in the CRT. As for the behavioral data in panel ii), we report the
frequency of choices that correspond to depositor 3 withdrawing. To assess
the importance of strategic uncertainty, we define a dummy variable (ISU )
that takes the value 1 when there is strategic uncertainty in position 3 (i.e.,
ISU takes the value 1 when either nothing or only a withdrawal is observed).
To see the importance of the CRT, we report the frequency of withdrawal
for participants with CRT equals to (larger than) 0, separately (see Brañas-
Garza et al. 2012).
The behavioral data show that withdrawal rate is 10% indicating that
most of the time depositors in position 3 recognize the dominant strategy
and tend to wait. Panel ii) also reveals the role of strategic uncertainty.
When depositor 3 makes her decision in the absence of strategic uncer-
tainty, 4% of decisions correspond to withdrawal (17% if there is strategic
uncertainty).13 The relationship between cognitive abilities and the with-
13A simple test of proportion suggest that differences are significant at any common
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Table 1: Summary of the data
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
i) Socio-demographics
Risk aversion 5.58 1.80 0 10
Gender (=1 if female) 0.50 0.50 0 1
Cognitive abilities (CRT) 0.57 0.98 0 3
ii) Behavioral data
Withdrawal rate 0.10 0.31 0 1
Withdrawal rate (ISU = 0) 0.04 0.19 0 1
Withdrawal rate (ISU = 1) 0.17 0.38 0 1
Withdrawal rate (CRT = 0) 0.12 0.33 0 1
Withdrawal rate (CRT > 0) 0.07 0.26 0 1
drawal decision is also worth mentioning. The frequency of withdrawal for
participants with CRT = 0 is almost twice as much as for participants with
CRT > 0.14 These findings highlight the importance of strategic uncertainty
and cognitive abilities on withdrawal decisions (e.g., participants with higher
cognitive abilities recognize the dominant strategy more easily.) One inter-
esting question to be addressed concerns the interaction between these two
variables.15
In order to provide some evidence in that dimension we perform an
econometric analysis. We estimate a logit model in which the dependent
significance level (z = 3.78, p− value = 0.0002)
14Grimm and Mengel (2012) use a different division and put participants with a CRT
score equal to 3 into one group (reflective participants) and the rest into another group.
When we group the data using these categories we see that reflective participants (CRT=3)
do never withdraw, but those with CRT < 3 do it (withdrawal rate equals 11%).
15Although we consider that strategic uncertainty and cognitive abilities are the leading
explanations for suboptimal behaviour, one may argue that depositors rush to withdraw
their money so as to behave according to what they have observed; i.e., depositor 3
may have a preference for conformity (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). If this were the case,
depositor 3 would be more likely to withdraw after observing two withdrawals, compared
with the case in which only one withdrawal is observed. Our data suggest that conformity
cannot explain departures from equilibrium prediction as depositor 3 never withdraws
upon observing two withdrawals, witht the withdrawal rate being roughly 17% when only
a withdrawal is observed.
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variable is the probability that depositor 3 withdraws. Because participants
are asked to make decisions during 15 rounds, we follow Garratt and Keister
(2009) in using History as a control variable. In our case, History is defined
as the share of previous rounds in which the participant observed the other
patient depositor withdrawing. We control for the socio-demographics pre-
sented in Table 1: risk, gender, and cognitive abilities (i.e., the dummy
variable ICRT equals 1 if CRT > 0, being 0 otherwise). We also include a
dummy variable to account for strategic uncertainty (ISU ). The estimated
standard errors in parentheses take into account matching group clustering
and are corrected using the Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell and McCaffrey,
2002).16 This analysis is summarized in Table 2.
Our estimates suggest that cognitive abilities affect the depositor’s be-
havior, but there is an interesting link between their predictive power and
strategic uncertainty, as indicated by the first regression where strategic
uncertainty and its interaction with CRT are both significant. To disentan-
gle the effect of strategic uncertainty and the CRT, we report in the last
two columns the marginal effects for withdrawal decisions with and without
strategic uncertainty. The importance of strategic uncertainty is clear from
the observed probability, which is estimated to be close to 0% when there
is no strategic uncertainty (it is roughly 15% when there is strategic uncer-
tainty). The effect of the CRT is also evident from Table 2. When decisions
are made in a context without strategic uncertainty, the dominant strategy
is easy to identify and the CRT has no predictive power (p-value = 0.361).
The CRT, however, predicts withdrawal decisions if there is strategic un-
certainty (p-value = 0.003). Participants who obtain a positive score in the
CRT are 15% less likely to withdraw.
Finally, we assess the issue of consistency of choices, which is frequently
related to cognitive abilities in the context of risk decisions (Eckel, 1999),
time decisions (Burks et al. 2009), and social preferences (Chen et al. 2013).
Because decisions are made with and without strategic uncertainty, we can
compute for each subject the difference between the frequency of withdraw-
ing in position 3 when there is strategic uncertainty and when there is not.
16Our results are invariant if we do not perform this correction, although in that case the
standard errors would be biased and we would be more likely to reject the null hypothesis
than our p-values would suggest (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Our results are also
robust if we use the score in the CRT instead of the dummy ICRT as independent variable
(see Table 3 in Appendix B for further details).
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Table 2: Marginal effects for withdrawal decisions in position 3 after logit
estimation.
Pooled No Strategic Strategic
Data Uncertainty Uncertainty
History -0.178 -0.048 -0.229
(0.133) (0.044) (0.205)
Risk aversion -0.002 0.0002 -0.009
(0.006) (0.001) (0.014)
Gender (=1 if female) 0.009 0.011 -0.040
(0.033) (0.013) (0.059)
Cognitive abilities (ICRT ) 0.126 0.032 -0.154**
(0.033) (0.035) (0.051)
Strategic uncert. (ISU ) 0.198**
(0.048)
ICRT x ISU -0.086**
(0.014)
Obs. Probability 0.063 0.004 0.149
Wald test 3.3e05** 39.722** 7.598**
Observations 312 154 158
Notes. The set of independent variables include the share of previous rounds in which the participant
observed the other patient depositor withdrawing (History), a proxy for risk aversion as measured with
the investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997), a dummy variable for the participant’s gender, a
dummy variable ICRT for the score in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in Frederick (2005), and a
dummy variable ISU for the possibility of choosing in a context with strategic uncertainty. The estimated
standard errors in parentheses take into account matching group clustering and are corrected using the
Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell and McCaffrey, 2002). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note that the larger the difference between these frequencies, the more the
subject reacts to strategic uncertainty (i.e., the less consistent decisions are).
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient suggest that our measure of consistency
correlates negatively with the CRT (ρ = −0.307, p − value = 0.032); i.e.,
subjects with higher measures of cognitive abilities are less likely to vary
their decisions in the presence of strategic uncertainty.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is a contribution to the stream of research that investigates the
predictive power of cognitive abilities in decision-making. We look at the
effect of the CRT on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run situation, as depos-
itors’ decisions have been frequently associated to irrational behavior. Our
game relies on the seminal model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that we
extend to allow for observability of actions. Interestingly, the last depositor
in the sequence of decisions has a dominant strategy in our setup, and should
always keep the money deposited if rational. One characteristic feature of
our design is that depositors may observe previous choices, what may affect
the degree of strategic uncertainty.
Our data show that the majority of our participants in our bank-run
game follow the dominant strategy and tend to wait, with withdrawal rates
being low. Observability of actions, however, is an important element at
stake in that withdrawals occur more frequently when there is strategic
uncertainty. In that context, the CRT has predictive power and participants
with higher abilities tend to identify the dominant strategy more easily.
Interestingly, the CRT does not predict behavior when there is no strategic
uncertainty.
Although we cast our model in a banking environment, run-like phenom-
ena occur in other institutions and markets as well in which investors can
easily withdraw their funds or cease to roll over their investment. In such
settings our analysis may be valid as well. For instance, Northern Rock, the
English bank, was not first run by depositors, but by large creditors who
provided short-term funding to the bank and did not renew it. Run-like
episodes also occurred in money-market, hedge and pension funds (Baba,
McCauley and Ramaswamy, 2009), the repo market (Gorton and Metrick,
2012) and even in bank lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In all these
situations depositors or investors may have a dominant strategy to wait and
not to act impulsively, but uncertainty about what other depositors have
done can foster panicking behavior. This effect is relevant, for instance,
for the optimal design of the deposit insurance, which should take into ac-
count that in these situations some depositors may run even if the insurance
scheme protects them. Our results suggest that more information about
previous decisions helps to reduce the probability of suboptimal decisions,
a message that is potentially relevant for policymakers.
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Appendix A: Instructions 17
Welcome to the experiment!
This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested
in your particular choices but in individuals’ average behavior. Therefore,
during the experiment, you will be treated anonymously. Neither the exper-
imenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
You will find the instructions on the computer screen explaining how the
experiment will unfold. The instructions are the same for all participants
in the laboratory and will be read aloud by experimenters. It is important
for you to understand the experiment before starting, as the money that
you will earn will depend on your choices. You also have a copy of the
instructions on your table.
Should you have any problem during the experiment, please raise your
hand and remember that you are not allowed to speak with anyone except
the experimenter.
Number of rounds
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are for you to
become familiar with the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be used
to determine your final payoff, so please be sure that you understand the
experiment before starting the 4th round. This will help you to earn more
money.
Deposits
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of
money (80 ECUs) to be deposited in a bank. The bank in which you will
invest your money will be formed by 3 depositors: one of them is you, one
is someone else in this room and the third depositor is simulated by the
computer. Therefore, the bank in which you deposit your money will have
240 ECUs per round in total.
17Instructions are originally in Spanish.
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Decisions and earnings
In principle, your decision is to choose whether to withdraw your money
from the common bank in the first period or to wait until the second period,
taking into account that your earnings will depend not only on your choice
but also on other depositors’ choices. It is important that you know that
the computer will always withdraw its money; thus, your earnings in each
round will depend only on your choice and the choice of the other depositor
in this room.
Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your
money, you will receive 140 ECUs, corresponding to your initial investment
(80 ECUs) plus interest generated during the first period (during which you
decided to wait).
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws
takes 100 ECUs (which is the same amount that the computer will take in
this case). The depositor who waits will receive 60 ECUs (corresponding to
the remaining amount in the bank after two withdrawals – 40 ECUs plus an
additional 20 ECUs interest).
Finally, it might be the case that both of you withdraw your money in
the first period. As a result, your earnings will depend on the available
amount of money in the bank and your position in the line. Therefore, if
you are at Position 1 or Position 2 in the line and decide to withdraw, you
will receive 100 ECUs, but if you are the last one in the line (Position 3),
only 40 ECUs remain in the bank, and that is the amount that you will
receive.
Therefore, your payoffs can be summarized in the following table:
 
  
 
In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait and 
only the computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
!
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will al-
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ways withdraw its money in the first period.
Before beginning, please consider that:
1. The person with whom you are linked will change every round. As
a result, do not think that you are going to play the whole game with the
same person.
2. You will always know your position in the line, but this position
might change in each round. In particular, you may be located in Position
1, Position 2 or Position 3 with the same probability. The same is true for
the computer.
3. In each round, you will have different information about what the
other depositors at your bank have done. Therefore, in some cases, you
will know what has happened before you arrived at the bank (number of
waitings and withdrawals), but in some other cases, you will not. When
you make your choice, you will also know whether someone else will observe
your action. It may be in your interest to consider this information when
making your decision. This information will appear on the left-hand side of
the computer screen.
E.g.: You are at Position 1. Depositors at Position 2 and Position 3
will observe your action.
E.g.: You are at Position 2. The depositor at Position 1 has waited.
The depositor at Position 3 will not observe your action.
On the right-hand side of your screen, a small graph shows with whom
you are linked (that is, who do you observe and who will observe you). If
there is no link between two depositors, the text on the screen indicates
that the depositor who decides later cannot observe the action of the other
depositor. If you see the symbol "?" , it indicates that you do not know if
the other two depositors are linked or not.
Final payoff
When the experiment ends, we randomly choose one of the 15 rounds and
pay you according to the earnings from that round. We convert your earn-
ings in that round at a rate 10 ECUs = 1 Euro.
We are now going to start with the first three rounds. At the end of the
three rounds, you can ask any questions to ensure that you understand the
procedure. If you have any doubts after the first three rounds, please raise
your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the experimenters as
25
soon as possible. Talking is forbidden during this experiment.
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Appendix B: Econometric results
This appendix replicates the econometric results of Section 5 for the case in
which the score in the CRT (instead of the dummy variable ICRT ) is used
as independent variable.
Table 3: Marginal effects for withdrawal decisions in position 3 after logit
regression
Pooled No Strategic Strategic
Data Uncertainty Uncertainty
History -0.188 -0.067 -0.226
(0.127) (0.040) (0.188)
Risk aversion -0.004 -0.0003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.012)
Women 0.001 0.008 -0.036
(0.033) (0.014) (0.057)
CRT 0.069 0.016 -0.336**
(0.034) (0.014) (0.120)
Str. Uncert. (SU) -0.168**
(0.041)
CRT x SU -0.228**
(0.067)
Obs. Probability 0.066 0.008 0.140
Wald test 6.10 e3** 60.75** 9.54**
Observations 312 154 158
Notes. The set of independent variables include the share of previous rounds in which the participant
observed the other patient depositor withdrawing (History), a proxy for risk aversion as measured with the
investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997), a dummy variable for the participant’s gender, the score
in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in Frederick (2005), and a dummy variable for the possibility of
choosing in a context with strategic uncertainty (SU). The estimated standard errors in parentheses take
into account matching group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell and
McCaffrey, 2002). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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